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ABSTRACT 
 
This research aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
company’s relative efficiency. The research sample is 34 public companies listed in 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. A modified Jones (1991) model is used to detect the 
earnings management practice as a proxy to corporate governance. In regard with the 
efficiency score, this research employs Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This 
research find that the there is no significant relationship between corporate governance 
and its efficiency 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance has become a popular research area and has been discussed 
internationally up until now. It comes up to the public and results with the awareness 
that pushed standard setters in many countries to develop and reform the corporate 
governance practices (Solomon, 2007). Against the background of well-known 
bankruptcies of corporations, e.g. Maxwell Group, Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, and 
other corporate; the financial scandals and failure of those big companies across 
countries had highlighted a weak corporate governance (Solomon, J., 2007, p.1; 
Zelenyuk, V., Zheka, V., 2004; Ehsan H. Feroz, Sanjay Goel, Raymond L. Raab., 
2006). At the time when economic crisis had attacked in 1997-1998, world became 
insufficient of transparency and accountability. A possible reason might be also due to 
poor corporate governance and even or maybe, no application of corporate governance 
(Nam and Nam, 2005). Looking from Asian financial crisis perspectives, Indonesia is 
the one country who is left behind from economic recovery compared to other Asian 
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countries (FCGI, 2006). The need to improve corporate governance to the 
international level is a challenge and highly recommended (Solomon, 2007). In Asia, 
corporate governance practices have become the important element of economic 
recovery model in overcoming economic crisis (FCGI, 2006).  
 
According from previous studies, Klein (2002) posits that corporate governance 
characteristics are related to earnings management. Therefore, earnings management 
and poor corporate governance mechanism are positively related. Other researchers 
(Huson et al., 2001; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Brown and. Caylor, 2004; Chtourou, 
Bedard, and Courteau, 2001; Xie, Davidson III, and DaDalt, 2001) believe that 
governance mechanisms include board characteristics, outside supervision and 
executive compensation, audit committee. Furthermore, Bruner (2004) argue that 
corporate governance of a firm should be a telltale for firm’s efficiency. Based on 
Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, K. (2006) and Manzoni (2007), efficiency is defined as the 
benefits realized and resources used.  
 There have been many studies analyzing the relationship between the earning 
management practices as a proxy to corporate governance and the company market 
performance. This study is aimed to investigate whether corporate governance also 
contributes to company’s efficiencies. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Corporate Governance 
 “Governance” is the action of controlling or directing. In a corporate setting, 
governance entails a system of oversight and delegation of decisions that reaches from 
the owners of the firm (the shareholders) to the board of directors, and from there to 
senior, middle, and front-line managers (Bruner, 2004). In April 1999, Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines corporate governance as 
the following. 
“Corporate governance is a system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on 
corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which 
the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance.” (cited in Encycogov, n.d). 
 
The main principles of Corporate Governance are required to guide achieving and 
enable maintaining sustainability beyond Corporations’ interests, especially 
shareholders.  According to NCCG (2006) of Indonesia, the five principles of GCG 
include Transparency, Accountability, Responsibility, Independency, and Fairness. 
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The implementation of GCG is required to be supported with three pillars (NCCG, 
2006). They are: 
1. The Government of Indonesia must construct rules and regulations that 
enhance a sustainable, efficient, and transparent business; and must 
implement consistent law enforcement; 
2. A business environment must encompass and implement GCG as its 
business principle to enhance a sustainable, efficient, and transparent 
business; 
3. A society must express a duty of care and commit a social control toward 
an object produced by a business in accordance with objective and 
accountable opinion. 
Based on Klein (2002), corporate governance characteristics are related to earnings 
management. She employs modified Jones model and uses discretionary portion of 
total accruals to capture earnings management. However, since discretionary accruals 
may be positive or negative, she uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals in 
the study. The sample consists of 687 large, publicly-traded U.S. firms with the 
assertion of better, more independent, corporate governance structures produces less 
earnings managements by management. It proves that the view of board characteristics 
geared towards producing a more independent and active corporate governance 
environment results in less earnings management. Many prior studies also believed 
with her findings, such as Baysinger and Butler (1985); Bhagat and Black (2002); 
Byrd and Hickman (1992); and Chtourou, S. M., Bedard, J., and Courteau, L. (2001); 
(Petra, S. T., 2006). Overall, earnings management and poor corporate governance 
mechanisms are positively related (Klein, 2002). 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) describe earnings management as follows: 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers”. 
 
Analysis of earnings management often focuses on management’s use discretionary 
accruals. The discretionary portion of total accruals is the appropriate measure to 
capture earnings management (Klein, 2002; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), 
because total accruals should capture a larger portion of managers’ manipulations 
(McNichols and Wilson, 1988). In addition, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) 
proposed that a modified version of the model developed by Jones (1991) is the most 
powerful tests for detecting earnings management. 
According to Klein (2002), corporate boards are at the heart of corporate governance 
as shareholders have delegated authority to the board to oversee and control decisions 
made by upper management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Boards of directors are 
responsible for monitoring the integrity of firm’s financial statements. A firm’s board 
of directors can be structured in many different ways so as to meet the needs of the 
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organization (Petra, S. T., 2006). Cited in Bruner (2003, p.704), Michael Jensen 
argued that the problem with internal corporate governance system start with the board 
of directors. The board has the final responsibility for the functioning the firm. The job 
of board is to hire, fire, and compensate the CEO, and to provide high-level counsel. 
Importantly, it is to provide an early warning system to put the organization back on 
track before difficulties reach a crisis stage. These corporate governance 
characteristics involve the proportion of outside directors, CEO duality, and board’s 
compensation committee. 
In contrast with study of Klein (2002), Sulistyono and Wibisono (2003) explore 
whether GCG can be implemented by the companies listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. 
They employed modified Jones (1991) model due to powerful test of detecting 
earnings management and uses discretionary accruals to capture earnings 
management. The sample used is 24 IDX companies for 5 years. Year 1996 and 1997 
are the periods before implementing GCG practices, year 1998 is the period of GCG 
implementation emerging, and year 1999-2000 are the obligation period of GCG 
implementation. As a result, they find that earnings management before and after 
implementing GCG practices has insignificant differences. 
 
Company’s Efficiency  
The measurement of company’s relative efficiency for this research employs Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model; based on Cooper, Seiford, and Tone (2007). 
Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) argued the concept of DEA that DEA constructs 
an efficient frontier composed of those firms that consume as little input as possible 
while maximizing as much output as possible. Those firms that reach the efficient 
frontier are efficient, while those firms below the efficient frontier are inefficient. 
Weights that give the best ratio score of 1 (100%) is efficient, whereas the weights that 
give the score of 0 and less than 1 is inefficient (Cooper et al, 2007). 
Furthermore, Zheka (2005) summarizes the three advantages of applying DEA to 
corporate governance context. First, the DEA is a nonparametric approach and does 
not impose any specific assumption of production functional form. Second, DEA 
focuses on the individual observations rather than on population average, compared 
with the regression analysis. Third, it compares firm performance to the revealed best-
practice frontier, rather than on the central-tendency properties of the frontier. 
 
DEA that measures relativity of efficiency within the data applies two orientations. 
Manzoni (2007) measures input orientation when the levels of outputs are maintained 
and gains are achieved by trying to minimize inputs while operating in the same 
environment.  In contrast, output orientation occurred when levels of inputs are 
maintained and gains are achieved by trying to maximize outputs while operating in 
the same environment. Since all companies consume resources (incur costs) in order to 
generate revenues and they are the objective measure of the firm’s operations; thus the 
output variable employed is sales revenues. The input variables measured are selling 
and general administrative expense and cost of sales. These costs include labor, 
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material, energy, and other costs. They explain firm efficiency because of the benefits 
of increasing revenues yet they will bear many of the costs of a firm. Second is capital 
(net working capital and fixed assets). A gain in output might result from an increase 
in capital (Cooper et al, 2007).  
Overall, the revenues and costs incorporate such important economic information as 
prices. Revenues are maximized, while efficiently minimizing expenses and resources 
(Zheka, 2005). All these variables are considered to reflect the portion of each sales of 
dollar needed to meet the efficiency of a company, which is the ratio of the output 
goods and services to input resources, which showed the ability to maximize output 
from a given input (Manzoni, 2007). 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Klein (2002) stated that corporate governance characteristics are related to earnings 
management. In addition, earnings management and poor corporate governance 
mechanism are positively related. She employs modified Jones model and uses 
discretionary portion of total accruals to capture earnings management. Since 
discretionary accruals may be positive or negative, he uses the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals in the study. Hence, the absolute value of discretionary portion 
of total accruals that illustrates earnings management is used in this research to capture 
corporate governance.  
However, Sulistyanto and Wibisono (2003) found that earnings management before 
and after implementing GCG practices in Indonesia has insignificant differences in 
terms of corporate governance. Bruner, R. F. (2004 p.79), however, suggested that 
corporate governance of a firm should be a telltale for firm’s efficiency. According to 
the above justification, the testable hypothesis of this study is that corporate 
governance is correlated to the company’s efficiency. 
 
 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
The sample is randomly selected and using samples of firm-year 2008. The sample 
will be randomly selected, taking into account the availability of data, the published 
financial statements for year ended 2008. The sampling design of this study is 
purposive sampling due to selective criteria as follows: 
a. A sample of 35 companies is subject to be listed in the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (IDX) in the years observed by the research, which are during period 
2008. 
b. A sample of 35 companies should have a complete set of financial reports and 
variables used in the research during period 2008. 
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c. The author excluded 1 company, which is PT Astra International Tbk, due to 
outlier’s data.  
These selective criteria have brought the total sample into 34 public listed companies; 
as shown in Appendix 1. 
 
Research Methodology 
The aim of this research is to investigate whether corporate governance is correlated to 
company’s relative efficiency, focused on Indonesian public listed companies in year 
2008. There are several stages conducted in this research. First, measuring the 
earnings management involves determining total accruals of Jones (1991) model and 
computing nondiscretionary accruals of Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney, 1995). The difference between those two data will result in discretionary 
portion of total accruals. Since discretionary accruals may be positive or negative, the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals will be employed in this study. Klein (2002) 
stated that corporate governance characteristics are related to earnings management. 
Hence, the absolute value of discretionary portion of total accruals that illustrates 
earnings management is used to capture corporate governance.  
Second, based on Cooper et al(2007), DEA-Solver model of software program is used 
to calculate the efficiency scores. The model used is CCR-O, called Output-oriented of 
Charnes-Cooper-Rhodes model. Following previous research studies of Lin, Ma, and 
Su (2008), two inputs and one output are employed in the efficiency analysis. The 
input variables are costs (COGS and SGA) and capital (working capital and fixed 
assets). They explain firm efficiency because of the benefits of increasing revenues yet 
they will bear many of the costs of a firm. Output variable is sales revenues, since a 
company consumes resources (incur costs) in order to generate revenues and they are 
the objective measure of the firm’s operations.  
Finally, the degree of association between those two variables is measured using 
nonparametric Spearman rank correlation coefficient. 
 
 
FINDINSGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Asset (bill Rp) 35 44.19 39.594 3.829 8.158 
ACCR (bill Rp) 35 (420) 2.458 147 531 
Absolute Value 35 0.0010 0.2542 0.0829 0.0581 
Score 35 0.0718 1.0000 0.1829 0.2166 
 
As is total assets in year τ;  
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ACCR is income before extraordinary items less cash flows from operation; 
The absolute discretionary accruals is Total accruals less Non-discretionary accruals 
(is standardized by lagged total assets); 
Score is the efficiency score, generated using DEA. 
 
As, ACCR, DA, Score denote total assets, total accruals, discretionary accruals, and 
efficiency score of DEA; respectively. It can be seen that all variables have positive 
mean. 
 
Findings on earnings management as to capture corporate governance 
mechanism: 
1. Determine Total Accruals  
Jones (1991) composed the total accruals is the difference between income 
before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations. The results are 
shown in appendix 2. 
2. Determine the estimate parameters of α1, α2, α3 from regression model 
From the sample, the regression model is applied where the dependent variable 
is total accruals and independent variables are 1/A τ-1, ∆REV τ, and PPE τ. The 
estimates of α1, α2, α3 are those obtained from the original Jones model and are 
generated using the following model: 
  
  
 Where, 
 TA τ   = total accruals scaled by total assets at τ-1; 
 A τ-1   = total assets at τ-1; 
 ∆REVτ = revenues in year τ less revenues in year τ-1 scaled by total assets at τ-1; 
 PPE τ  = gross property, plant, and equipment in year τ scaled by lagged total assets; 
a 1, a 2, a 3  =  α1, α2, α3 (parameters); 
 υ  = error terms;  
 
Using SPSS software, it generates coefficient parameters, as shown below, that 
will be used to calculate nondiscretionary accruals amount. 
 
Table 2. Regression analysis results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficients(a)   
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
    B 
1 1/Tat-1 (bill Rp) 9.776 
  Rev/Tat-1 0.0717 
  PPEt/Tat-1 -0.0746 
a Dependent Variable: ACCRUALS 
TA τ = a 1(1/A τ-1) + a 2 (∆REV τ) + a 3 (PPE τ) + υ    (1)
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3. Compute predicted Nondiscretionary accruals 
After estimating the parameters of α1, α2, α3 from regression model, in the 
Modified version model of Jones (Dechow, P., Sloan, R., and Sweeny, A., 
1995), nondiscretionary accruals are estimated as: 
 
  
          
 
Where, 
 A τ-1   = total assets at τ-1; 
 ∆REVτ= revenues in year τ less revenues in year τ-1 scaled by total assets at τ-1; 
 ∆RECτ= net receivables in year τ less net receivables in year τ-1 scaled by total assets 
at τ-1; 
 PPEτ = gross property, plant, and equipment in year τ scaled by total assets at τ-1; 
 α 1, α 2, α 3 = firm – specific parameters; 
 
4. Compute Discretionary accruals 
The discretionary accruals are then computed by subtracting the predicted level 
of nondiscretionary accruals (NDAP) from total accruals (standardized by 
lagged total assets) (Dechow et al, 1995). Since discretionary accruals may be 
positive or negative, this research uses the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals in the study.  The discretionary accruals of each company is presented 
in appendix 4. 
As with corporate governance relates to earnings management, the absolute value of 
discretionary portion of total accruals (as proxy of earnings management) is used in 
this study to capture corporate governance. Then, it will be examined to correlate with 
the efficiency scores computed from DEA. 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Refer to Banker et al (1984), those firms that reach the efficient frontier are efficient, 
while those firms below the efficient frontier are inefficient. It is efficient, if the 
efficiency score is denoted by 1 (efficient frontier). The result of DEA analysis, two 
firms are categorized as efficient are PT Sugi Samapersada Tbk (100%) and PT Surya 
Intrindo Makmur Tbk (100%). While the remaining are inefficient. The efficiency 
score of each company is presented in appendix 5. 
 
Spearman’s Correlation 
This study then uses Spearman’s Rank Correlation in order to analyze the correlation 
between discretionary accruals and efficiency scores, because the required condition 
of normality is unsatisfied. 
 
 
 
NDA τ = α 1(1/A τ-1) + α 2 (∆REV τ - ∆REC τ) + α 3 (PPE τ)   (2) 
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Table 3. Spearman’s Rank Correlation analysis results 
 
   
Discretionary 
accruals 
Efficiency 
score 
Spearman's rho Discretionary 
accruals 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1 0.196 
  Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.266 
  N 34 34 
 Efficiency 
score 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.196 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.266 . 
  N 34 34 
 
Although the discretionary accruals appear to have a positive correlation to company’s 
efficiency score, the statistic is insignificant at α = 0.05. Since discretionary accruals is 
used as a proxy to the corporate governance, the result implies that there is no 
significant relationship between corporate governance and company’s efficiency. 
This research finding is aligned with previous study of Sulistyanto and Wibisono 
(2003), where they found that earnings management before and after implementing 
GCG practices has no significant differences in terms of corporate governance 
The results could also imply that discretionary accrual approach fails to capture 
corporate governance characteristics in Indonesia.  
Another possible explanation is that commonly, companies in Indonesia create 
multiple accounting reports. Thereby, they might use much earnings management 
when they engage in obtaining loan from bank or for the purpose of tax report. As the 
discretionary opportunities rise, the dual-book system is clouding the true picture of 
how firms are actually performing (Cullen and Desai, 2005). 
According to the pillars of GCG (KNKG, 2006), “The Government of Indonesia must 
construct rules and regulations that enhance sustainable, efficient, and transparent 
business; and must implement consistent law enforcement in order to incorporate 
GCG.” However, Corruption and bribery are clouding significantly to the portrait of 
Indonesian economy. It is not possible to achieve a sustainable business when 
“additional” fee exists in the business itself (Daniri and Simatupang, 2008). As a 
result, corporate governance in Indonesia might be poorly employed, as shown by the 
high level of corruption activity. Based on Index Perception of Corruption, in a range 
of 0-10, Indonesia had a score of 1.7 in year 1999-2000, a score of 2.0 in year 2004, 
and a score of 2.2 in year 2005. Although its score improved slightly, Indonesia still 
considered as a highly corrupt country. Noting 0 represents the highest level of 
corruption, while 10 represents the lowest level of corruption (Lubis, 2005; Wijaya, 
2008) 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This research is aimed to investigate whether corporate governance is correlated with 
company’s relative efficiency specifically for public companies listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. Throughout this research, the discretionary portion of total accruals 
is used to detect earnings management and hence, is expected to capture corporate 
governance. Klein (2002) shows corporate governance is related to earnings 
management. To calculate the relative efficiency scores, this research employs DEA of 
Charnes-Cooper-Rhodes output orientation model. In summary, this research find that 
the correlation coefficient between discretionary portion of total accruals (as proxy of 
earnings management) and company’s relative efficiency is not significant. Therefore, 
it is concluded that there is no relationship between the corporate governance and 
company’s efficiency. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Sample of 34 Public Companies Listed in IDX 
No. COMPANIES CODE 
1 PT AdeS Waters Indonesia Tbk ADES 
2 PT Aqua Golden Mississippi Tbk AQUA 
3 PT Astra Otoparts Tbk AUTO 
4 PT Sepatu Bata Tbk BATA 
5 PT Primarindo Asia Infrastructure Tbk BIMA 
6 PT Indo Kordsa Tbk  BRAM 
7 PT Cahaya Kalbar Tbk CEKA 
8 PT Delta Djakarta Tbk DLTA 
9 PT Ever Shine Textile Industry Tbk ESTI 
10 PT Goodyear Indonesia Tbk GDYR 
11 PT Gudang Garam Tbk GGRM 
12 PT Gajah tunggal Tbk GJTL 
13 PT Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk HMSP 
14 PT Indofarma Tbk INAF 
15 PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk INDF 
16 PT Indocemenet Tunggal Prakasa Tbk INTP 
17 PT Kimia Farma Tbk KAEF 
18 PT Kabelindo Murni Tbk KBLM 
19 PT Kalbe Farma Tbk KLBF 
20 PT Merck Tbk MERK 
21 PT Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk MLBI 
22 PT Mustika Ratu Tbk MRAT 
23 PT Nipress Tbk NIPS 
24 PT Pan Brothers Tex Tbk PBRX 
25 PT Prima Alloy Steel Tbk PRAS 
26 PT Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk PSDN 
27 PT Pyramid Farma Tbk PYFA 
28 PT Roda Vivatex Tbk RDTX 
29 PT Bentoel International Inv. Tbk RMBA 
30 PT Surya Intrindo Makmur Tbk SIMM 
31 PT Sekar Laut Tbk SKLT 
32 PT Siantar TOP Tbk STTP 
33 PT Sugi Samapersada Tbk SUGI 
34 PT Ultra Jaya Milk Tbk ULTJ 
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Appendix 2: Total Accruals of 34 Companies 
COMPANIES TOTAL ACCRUALS 
PT AdeS Waters Indonesia Tbk 8,257,000,000 
PT Aqua Golden Mississippi Tbk (62,317,731,688) 
PT Astra Otoparts Tbk (200,023,000,000) 
PT Sepatu Bata Tbk 21,584,649,000 
PT Primarindo Asia Infrastructure Tbk 12,799,890,465 
PT Indo Kordsa Tbk (116,608,469,000) 
PT Cahaya Kalbar Tbk 115,035,640,933 
PT Delta Djakarta Tbk (94,030,394,000) 
PT Ever Shine Textile Industry Tbk (57,682,573,508) 
PT Goodyear Indonesia Tbk 82,161,503,000 
PT Gudang Garam Tbk 1,680,592,000,000 
PT Gajah tunggal Tbk (139,150,000,000) 
PT Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk (420,049,000,000) 
PT Indofarma Tbk 255,161,221,005 
PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 2,458,223,000,000 
PT Indocemenet Tunggal Prakasa Tbk 253,461,707,948 
PT Kimia Farma Tbk 98,625,504,951 
PT Kabelindo Murni Tbk 43,578,791,515 
PT Kalbe Farma Tbk 687,529,085,774 
PT Merck Tbk 39,307,457,000 
PT Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk (37,333,000,000) 
PT Mustika Ratu Tbk 4,418,836,731 
PT Nipress Tbk 22,165,340,857 
PT Pan Brothers Tex Tbk 116,842,388,329 
PT Prima Alloy Steel Tbk (15,759,370,210) 
PT Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk (3,516,938,366) 
PT Pyramid Farma Tbk 6,757,921,101 
PT Roda Vivatex Tbk (30,051,604,047) 
PT Bentoel International Inv. Tbk 460,198,538,373 
PT Surya Intrindo Makmur Tbk 9,015,718,045 
PT Sekar Laut Tbk (2,574,354,684) 
PT Siantar TOP Tbk 37,809,999,521 
PT Sugi Samapersada Tbk 11,690,628,020 
PT Ultra Jaya Milk Tbk (232,926,451,331) 
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Appendix 3: Nondiscretionary Accruals of 34 Companies 
COMPANIES NDAt 
PT AdeS Waters Indonesia Tbk   (0.04143477) 
PT Aqua Golden Mississippi Tbk   (0.03503182) 
PT Astra Otoparts Tbk   (0.00098496) 
PT Sepatu Bata Tbk   (0.00451553) 
PT Primarindo Asia Infrastructure Tbk     0.03729583 
PT Indo Kordsa Tbk   (0.07396497) 
PT Cahaya Kalbar Tbk     0.10816783 
PT Delta Djakarta Tbk   (0.03820092) 
PT Ever Shine Textile Industry Tbk   (0.05679218) 
PT Goodyear Indonesia Tbk   (0.08171183) 
PT Gudang Garam Tbk   (0.02618748) 
PT Gajah tunggal Tbk   (0.04373264) 
PT Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk   (0.00447019) 
PT Indofarma Tbk     0.01001969 
PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk   (0.01228308) 
PT Indocemenet Tunggal Prakasa Tbk   (0.07944315) 
PT Kimia Farma Tbk   (0.00868921) 
PT Kabelindo Murni Tbk   (0.00861826) 
PT Kalbe Farma Tbk   (0.02063198) 
PT Merck Tbk     0.02711785 
PT Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk   (0.04156757) 
PT Mustika Ratu Tbk     0.00918529 
PT Nipress Tbk   (0.01116154) 
PT Pan Brothers Tex Tbk   (0.00843011) 
PT Prima Alloy Steel Tbk   (0.06540376) 
PT Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk     0.01264577 
PT Pyramid Farma Tbk     0.06230209 
PT Roda Vivatex Tbk   (0.07517862) 
PT Bentoel International Inv. Tbk   (0.00099577) 
PT Surya Intrindo Makmur Tbk   (0.03349713) 
PT Sekar Laut Tbk     0.04633155 
PT Siantar TOP Tbk   (0.05890182) 
PT Sugi Samapersada Tbk     0.14052361 
PT Ultra Jaya Milk Tbk   (0.04647933) 
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Appendix 4: Discretionary Portion of Total Accruals 
COMPANIES ACCRt NDAt Dat 
PT AdeS Waters Indonesia Tbk 0.04619016   (0.04143477) 0.087625 
PT Aqua Golden Mississippi Tbk -0.06989979   (0.03503182) -0.034868 
PT Astra Otoparts Tbk -0.05790628   (0.00098496) -0.056921 
PT Sepatu Bata Tbk 0.06701637   (0.00451553) 0.071532 
PT Primarindo Asia Infrastructure Tbk 0.13171750     0.03729583  0.094422 
PT Indo Kordsa Tbk -0.07499597   (0.07396497) -0.001031 
PT Cahaya Kalbar Tbk 0.18745231     0.10816783  0.079284 
PT Delta Djakarta Tbk -0.15873880   (0.03820092) -0.120538 
PT Ever Shine Textile Industry Tbk -0.10667697   (0.05679218) -0.049885 
PT Goodyear Indonesia Tbk 0.14174053   (0.08171183) 0.223452 
PT Gudang Garam Tbk 0.07067264   (0.02618748) 0.096860 
PT Gajah tunggal Tbk -0.01596936   (0.04373264) 0.027763 
PT Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk -0.02603531   (0.00447019) -0.021565 
PT Indofarma Tbk 0.26419356     0.01001969  0.254174 
PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 0.08274924   (0.01228308) 0.095032 
PT Indocemenet Tunggal Prakasa Tbk 0.02525040   (0.07944315) 0.104694 
PT Kimia Farma Tbk 0.06604568   (0.00868921) 0.074735 
PT Kabelindo Murni Tbk 0.10071797   (0.00861826) 0.109336 
PT Kalbe Farma Tbk 0.13380706   (0.02063198) 0.154439 
PT Merck Tbk 0.11873133     0.02711785  0.091613 
PT Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk -0.06003683   (0.04156757) -0.018469 
PT Mustika Ratu Tbk 0.01398376     0.00918529  0.004798 
PT Nipress Tbk 0.07636747   (0.01116154) 0.087529 
PT Pan Brothers Tex Tbk 0.14025132   (0.00843011) 0.148681 
PT Prima Alloy Steel Tbk -0.02902493   (0.06540376) 0.036379 
PT Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk -0.01205574     0.01264577  -0.024702 
PT Pyramid Farma Tbk 0.07101838     0.06230209  0.008716 
PT Roda Vivatex Tbk -0.05150636   (0.07517862) 0.023672 
PT Bentoel International Inv. Tbk 0.11924836   (0.00099577) 0.120244 
PT Surya Intrindo Makmur Tbk 0.07661249   (0.03349713) 0.110110 
PT Sekar Laut Tbk -0.01409081     0.04633155  -0.060422 
PT Siantar TOP Tbk 0.07307013   (0.05890182) 0.131972 
PT Sugi Samapersada Tbk 0.20863552     0.14052361  0.068112 
PT Ultra Jaya Milk Tbk -0.17091386   (0.04647933) -0.124435 
 
 
Olivia Liputri & Junius Tirok / Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting 2(2) 31 - 50 48 
Appendix 5: Efficiency Score using DEA-Solver Software 
Rank DMU Score 
1 PT Sugi Samapersada Tbk 1.00000000 
1 PT Surya Intrindo Makmur Tbk 1.00000000 
3 PT Primarindo Asia Infrastructure Tbk 0.41710021 
4 PT Delta Djakarta Tbk 0.22662260 
5 PT Merck Tbk 0.21931421 
6 PT Pan Brothers Tex Tbk 0.19611553 
7 PT Indofarma Tbk 0.17062495 
8 PT Cahaya Kalbar Tbk 0.14992902 
9 PT Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk 0.14555425 
10 PT Nipress Tbk 0.14438653 
11 PT Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk 0.14310874 
12 PT Astra Otoparts Tb 0.14256013 
13 PT Kimia Farma Tbk 0.13592626 
14 PT Aqua Golden Mississippi Tbk 0.12485550 
15 PT Prima Alloy Steel Tbk 0.12089372 
16 PT Sekar Laut Tbk 0.11782688 
17 PT Ever Shine Textile Industry Tbk 0.11721893 
18 PT Gudang Garam Tbk 0.11471971 
19 PT Bentoel International Inv. Tbk 0.11178996 
20 PT Kabelindo Murni Tbk 0.11006822 
21 PT Sepatu Bata Tbk 0.10996279 
22 PT Roda Vivatex Tbk 0.10777714 
23 PT Kalbe Farma Tbk 0.10743118 
24 PT Goodyear Indonesia Tbk 0.10040554 
25 PT Gajah tunggal Tbk 0.09967416 
26 PT Siantar TOP Tbk 0.09606318 
27 PT Pyramid Farma Tbk 0.09536486 
28 PT AdeS Waters Indonesia Tbk 0.09223052 
29 PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 0.09161769 
30 PT Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk 0.08903654 
31 PT Indocement Tunggal Prakasa Tbk 0.08744097 
32 PT Indo Kordsa Tbk 0.08596934 
33 PT Ultra Jaya Milk Tbk 0.07395274 
34 PT Mustika Ratu Tbk 0.07176187 
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Figure 1. Efficiency Score using DEA-Solver Software 
 
 
Appendix 6: One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 
 
Absolute 
Value Score 
N 34 34 
Mean .08288270 .18286188 
Normal Parameters(a,b) Std. Deviation .058078011 .216554181 
Absolute .090 .355 
Positive .090 .355 
Most Extreme Differences 
Negative -.079 -.304 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .525 2.067 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .945 .000 
     a  Test distribution is Normal. 
     b  Calculated from data. 
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Appendix 7: Absolute Value and Efficiency Scores 
COMPANIES Absolute Value Score 
PT AdeS Waters Indonesia Tbk 0.087625 0.092231 
PT Aqua Golden Mississippi Tbk 0.034868 0.124856 
PT Astra Otoparts Tbk 0.056921 0.142560 
PT Sepatu Bata Tbk 0.071532 0.109963 
PT Primarindo Asia Infrastructure Tbk 0.094422 0.417100 
PT Indo Kordsa Tbk 0.001031 0.085969 
PT Cahaya Kalbar Tbk 0.079284 0.149929 
PT Delta Djakarta Tbk 0.120538 0.226623 
PT Ever Shine Textile Industry Tbk 0.049885 0.117219 
PT Goodyear Indonesia Tbk 0.223452 0.100406 
PT Gudang Garam Tbk 0.096860 0.114720 
PT Gajah tunggal Tbk 0.027763 0.099674 
PT Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk 0.021565 0.143109 
PT Indofarma Tbk 0.254174 0.170625 
PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 0.095032 0.091618 
PT Indocemenet Tunggal Prakasa Tbk 0.104694 0.087441 
PT Kimia Farma Tbk 0.074735 0.135926 
PT Kabelindo Murni Tbk 0.109336 0.110068 
PT Kalbe Farma Tbk 0.154439 0.107431 
PT Merck Tbk 0.091613 0.219314 
PT Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk 0.018469 0.089037 
PT Mustika Ratu Tbk 0.004798 0.071762 
PT Nipress Tbk 0.087529 0.144387 
PT Pan Brothers Tex Tbk 0.148681 0.196116 
PT Prima Alloy Steel Tbk 0.036379 0.120894 
PT Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk 0.024702 0.145554 
PT Pyramid Farma Tbk 0.008716 0.095365 
PT Roda Vivatex Tbk 0.023672 0.107777 
PT Bentoel International Inv. Tbk 0.120244 0.111790 
PT Surya Intrindo Makmur Tbk 0.110110 1.000000 
PT Sekar Laut Tbk 0.060422 0.117827 
PT Siantar TOP Tbk 0.131972 0.096063 
PT Sugi Samapersada Tbk 0.068112 1.000000 
PT Ultra Jaya Milk Tbk 0.124435 0.073953 
 
